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ABSTRACT 
This paper asks whether, for the sake of human dignity, regulators should adopt a 
precautionary approach to the development of smart machines. Having identified a set of 
essential (or commons’) conditions for the existence of human social agents, including 
respect for human dignity in both foundational and non-foundational senses, consideration is 
given to human reliance on personal digital assistants, to the development of autonomous 
vehicles and lethal autonomous weapons systems, and to the use of smart machines in the 
criminal justice system. The paper concludes that, while smart machines should not be 
destroyed, a degree of precaution for the sake of human dignity is warranted. In particular, it 
is recommended that international agencies should monitor the impact of smart machines on 
the commons’ conditions; and that national commissions should facilitate the articulation of 
the local social licence for the development and application of such machines.     
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1. Introduction 
This is a paper about the regulatory challenges and opportunities presented by today’s ‘smart’ 
technologies—that is to say, those technologies that, enabled by machine-learning, have the 
capacity not only to operate in an intelligent manner but also, in many cases, to outperform 
humans.1 In particular, it is a paper about the relationship between smart machines and 
human dignity. 
Although smart machines are very much the talk of the twenty-first century, we can start in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, with Samuel Butler’s novel, Erewhon.2 To Butler’s 
Victorian readers, the practices of the inhabitants of that eponymous distant land must have 
seemed quite extraordinary. How could the Erewhonians think it appropriate to punish those 
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1  For a very clear account of the way in which ‘machine learning’ operates and its potential utility in 
legal practice (particularly in the context of litigation), see Harry Surden, ‘Machine Learning and Law’ 
(2014) 89 Washington Law Review 87. 
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who fall ill while sympathising with those who commit crimes? How could they think it 
rational to destroy their machines?3 How could such intelligent and technologically 
sophisticated people have gone backwards in this way?  
Yet, the beauty of Erewhon is that, to some present-day readers—particularly readers who are 
familiar with, say, Superintelligence4 or Homo Deus5 or Here be Dragons6—the practices of 
the Erewhonians might seem to be anything but benighted. For example, were the 
Erewhonians so stupid in supposing that, where an individual misbehaves, such conduct is to 
be treated as ‘the result of either pre-natal or post-natal misfortune’?7 Is it so ridiculous to 
think that, with the acceleration in technological development, machines might become much 
smaller and smarter, capable of reproducing themselves, communicating with one another, 
and displaying various degrees of intelligence (if not intelligence as humans understand it) 
and agency? Most importantly, would it be crazy to regard machines as a threat to the human 
condition that warranted at least some precautionary measures—albeit perhaps not precaution 
on the scale exercised by the Erewhonians who destroyed ‘all the inventions that had been 
discovered for the preceding 271 years’?8   
As is well-known, human chess players no longer reign supreme. Indeed, it is already 20 
years since Deep Blue was programmed to beat Garry Kasparov the then world champion 
chess player;9 and, since that time, the processing power of computers has continued to grow 
in the way predicted by Moore’s Law.10 However, we are still coming to terms with the 
capacity of machines to learn how to get better at playing games that are even more 
computationally challenging than chess. Notably, in March 2016, when AlphaGo defeated 
Lee Sedol, the South Korean world champion Go player, even the developers of this smart 
technology were surprised by the effectiveness of their machine-learning (ML) algorithms. 
Recalling Butler’s cautionary tale, the focal question in this paper is whether we are at a point 
when we should suspend further development of smart machines. More specifically, the 
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question is whether we should so act for the sake of human dignity—a notion not explicitly 
part of the Erewhonians’ thinking but which we might take nowadays to be central to any 
rational and justified limits that are set on the development and application of modern 
technologies.11   
While the development of smart games-playing machines (such as IBM’s Watson12 and 
AlphaGo itself) might have some impact on human games-players—indeed, some might 
argue that there is an ‘indignity’ in a human being beaten by a machine—I suggest that this 
raises no serious questions about human dignity. However, there are other applications of ML 
where such questions might be raised. From the many potential applications of machine 
learning, I propose to consider four particular cases, namely: (i) the use of ML in consumer 
recommender systems together with personal digital assistants (or cyberbutlers); (ii) the 
programming of moral decision-making into ML-enabled autonomous vehicles; (iii) the use 
of ML in lethal autonomous weapons systems; and (iv) the use of ML for the purposes of 
profiling, prediction, and prevention in the criminal justice system. 
The paper is in five principal parts. First, starting with the idea that what we humans have in 
common is our ‘humanity’, I sketch a triple bottom line for twenty-first century regulators 
whose responsibilities are to protect and preserve (including by taking precautionary 
measures) the essential conditions (the commons’ conditions) for a community of human 
agents with moral aspirations. These conditions relate to the possibility of human existence, 
the possibility of agency and self-development, and the possibility of moral development and 
moral action. While familiar theories of human dignity—notably, those liberal rights-based 
and conservative duty-based theories that are so often appealed to in order to contest such 
matters as the treatment of human embryos, the commercialisation and commodification of 
the human body, the permissibility of assisted suicide and euthanasia, and so on13—articulate 
in ways that underline these (commons’) responsibilities of both regulators and regulatees, I 
suggest that there is a more formal foundational sense in which human dignity is at stake. 
Quite simply, this is the idea that, because humans express their dignity when they freely 
choose to do the right thing, one aspect of the commons’ responsibilities is to maintain the 
conditions for the development and operationalisation of human dignity so understood. While 
this understanding of human dignity does not prescribe what prospective moral agents should 
judge to be right and what wrong—it is for each agent to make their own judgment as to 
                                                          
11  Compare Marcus Duwell, ‘Human Dignity and the Ethics and Regulation of Technology’ in Roger 
Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and 
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relationship between human dignity and the regulation of technologies is about nothing less than the 
question of what an appropriate normative framework for the contemporary technology-driven world 
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2016) 102-127. 
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Press, 2014) 1-22. 
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what, in the instant case, is the right thing to do—it does prescribe the pre-conditions for 
agents to be able to reason and act in this way.14  
Secondly, turning to applications of ML, I assess whether personal digital assistants (PDAs), 
cyberbutlers, and consumer recommender systems, and the like, might compromise human 
dignity—whether in the formal foundational sense or as understood in various liberal and 
conservative views. Thirdly, although the contexts are very different, I consider (i) whether 
the programming of moral decision-making into autonomous road traffic vehicles might 
compromise human dignity and (ii) the argument that the use of autonomous weapons is a 
violation of human dignity. In both cases, it might be argued that, where life-and-death 
choices or decisions are being made, humans should be ‘in the loop’.15 Fourthly, I consider 
whether the use of ML for the purposes of profiling, prediction, and prevention in the 
criminal justice system might compromise human dignity—again, whether in the formal 
foundational sense or as understood in various liberal and conservative views. Finally, I 
review the kinds of precautionary measures that might be taken, and how they might be 
justified, in response to the uncertain impact of ML. One of the key points here is that the 
arguments for precaution are altogether more compelling where the perceived threat of ML 
relates to the commons’ conditions themselves (including the conditions that pertain to 
human dignity in the formal foundational sense) rather than to acts, activities, or practices 
that presuppose the existence of those conditions. 
My conclusion, in company with the Erewhonians, is that there are reasons to be concerned 
about the machines. To be sure, smart cities and comprehensively intelligent machines might 
be some way off. Nevertheless, a culture of reliance on smart machines—whether PDAs or 
autonomous vehicles—might compromise the conditions for the moral development of 
human agents (and, with that, human dignity in a foundational sense); the use of ML for risk-
assessment purposes in the criminal justice system poses obvious threats to a liberal 
conception of human dignity that attaches importance to due process and the rights of 
individuals; the use of lethal autonomous weapons might indirectly diminish respect for 
human dignity and the right to life; and, where ML is implicated in the technological 
management of risk, there are again concerns about how this impacts on the pre-conditions 
for moral community (especially, on human dignity in the foundational sense). However, by 
contrast with the Erewhonians, I do not propose that we should terminate the development of 
machine learning or destroy all records of machine-related learning since the Industrial 
Revolution. Rather, I suggest that we need to work on two things. First, we need to ensure 
that we have in place international agencies (new or existing) whose responsibility is to 
monitor the impact of machine learning on the commons’ conditions and to take whatever 
                                                          
14  Compare Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Simply Trying to Do the Right 
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Argument’ (Lawfare Institute) available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/undignified-killer-robots-
problem-human-dignity-argument (last accessed October 29, 2016). 
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precautionary measures might be required. Secondly, at national level, we need to establish 
Commissions whose responsibility, on the one hand, is to liaise with the international 
agencies and, on the other, to assist their communities in developing an informed and 
inclusive ‘social licence’16 for new technologies—that is to say, in the present context, the 
development of agreed terms and conditions for the socially acceptable use and application of 
machine learning in their territory.17  
2. Humanity and the Triple Bottom Line for Regulators 
According to Mary Aiken,  
the gender battles of the previous century will seem like a picnic compared with 
what’s coming next: the battle between humans and artificial intelligence. It’s time to 
forget about our differences—gender, ethnicity, nationality—and focus on the thing 
that unites us, our humanity.18 
While we might not share Aiken’s view that what lies ahead is a ‘battle’ between humans and 
smart machines,19 it seems to me that her call for humans to come together under the banner 
of their shared humanity is exactly right. 
Guided by Aiken, we might think that a plausible response to the question in this paper—that 
is to say, the question of whether ML might compromise human dignity—runs along the 
following lines. It is for each society to debate and then determine the terms and conditions 
on which ML is to be licensed. In some communities, there might be no licence at all or, as in 
Erewhon, a licence once granted might be revoked; but, in other communities, the use and 
application of ML will be authorised and limited by a social licence. The extent to which 
                                                          
16  Here, I am using the term ‘social licence’ in a sense that is akin to a ‘social contract’. This is broader 
than saying that some particular x (whether an act, practice, or policy), even though ‘compliant’ 
relative to some positive standards (e.g., legal or regulatory standards, professional standards, or the 
like) nevertheless lacks a social licence. That said, there is interesting work to be done in exploring the 
gap between technical rule-compliance and social acceptability (for example, in relation to tax 
avoidance schemes, corporate social responsibility, parliamentarians’ expenses, and so on). For an 
example of this gap, see Pam Carter, Graeme T. Laurie, and Mary Dixon-Woods, ‘The social licence 
for research: why care.data ran into trouble’ Journal of Medical Ethics (published online 23 January, 
2015) doi. 10.1136/me3dethics-2014-102374. 
 
17  Compare Geoff Mulgan’s proposal for the establishment of a Machine Intelligence Commission: 
available at http://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/machine-intelligence-commission-uk (blog ‘A machine 
intelligence commission for the UK’, February 22, 2016: last accessed December 11, 2016); Olly 
Bustom et al, An Intelligent Future? Maximising the Opportunities and Minimising the Risks of 
Artificial Intelligence in the UK (Future Advocacy, London, October 2016) (proposing a Standing 
Commission on AI to examine the social, ethical, and legal implications of recent and potential 
developments in AI); HC Science and Technology Committee, Robotics and Artificial Intelligence HC 
145 2016-17. 
 
18  Mary Aiken, The Cyber Effect (John Murray, 2016) at 316. 
 
19  If we conceive of a ‘battle’ in terms of a conflict between groups of agents with a degree of 
‘consciousness’ and ‘intentionality’, then this raises the question of whether smart machines could ever 
cross such a threshold. For reflections on such matters, see Amedeo Santosuosso, ‘The Human Rights 
of Nonhuman Artificial Entities: An Oxymoron?’ (2014) 19 Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik 203. 
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these licensing decisions reflect a concern about human dignity is likely to vary from one 
society to another, depending not least on the particular conception of human dignity that 
prevails in each society. Nevertheless, if we follow Aiken in focusing on our humanity, I 
suggest that we might find some significant common ground. 
In this section of the paper, I will start by sketching the three dimensions of this common 
ground—these dimensions relating respectively to the existence pre-conditions, the self-
development and agency pre-conditions, and the moral development and opportunity pre-
conditions for humanity; then, I will explain how I see human dignity fitting into, and relating 
to, these pre-conditions; and, finally, I will indicate a puzzle about the scope and application 
of the dignity conditions that I will have to leave for another time. 
2.1 Common ground   
In what respect might there be common ground between humans and their communities? If 
we equate ‘humanity’ with a community of human agents with moral aspirations, then what 
should we take to be the common ground between such agents? Or, to put this slightly 
differently, what common ground should be assumed by regulators who are charged (among 
other things) with sustaining the conditions for such communities?20 At once, it seems to me, 
we have a triple bottom line for today’s regulators. Quite simply, the terms and conditions of 
any regulatory (or social) licence for new technologies should be such as to protect, preserve, 
and promote: 
• the essential conditions for human existence (given human biological needs); 
• the generic conditions for human agency; and, 
• the essential conditions for the development and practice of moral agency.  
Moreover, these are imperatives for regulators in all regulatory spaces, whether international 
or national, public or private. From the responsibilities for the commons, there are no 
exemptions or exceptions; we are dealing here with principles that are truly cosmopolitan.21 
In the first instance, regulators should take steps to protect, preserve and promote the natural 
ecosystem for human life. Starting with the maintenance of the so-called ‘planetary 
boundaries’,22 regulators need to prevent the occurrence of (or, at any rate, minimise the 
                                                          
20  I am grateful to Christian Illies for pressing me to be more precise about the viewpoint from which the 
common ground implicit in humanity is to be developed. While there might be some views that purport 
to challenge the need to preserve the bottom-line conditions—even the view that humanity is morally 
required to put an end to its own existence—these are either views that regulators need not take 
seriously or views that can only be presented to regulators if the bottom-line conditions are in place. 
Alternatively, following a suggestion by Illies, the argument might be strengthened if a further set of 
essential conditions, for the long-term sustainability of the moral community, were to be added. 
  
21  Compare Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) Ch. 7; and Regulatory Cosmopolitanism: Clubs, Commons, and Questions of Coherence” 
TILT Working Papers No 18 (2010). 
 
22  Understood as ‘the non-negotiable planetary conditions that humanity needs to respect in order to avoid 
the risk of deleterious or even catastrophic environmental change at continental to global scales’: see, J. 
Rockström et al, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity’ (2009) 14 
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damage caused by) human-initiated existential threats—for example, the threats presented by 
ozone-depleting chemicals, dangerous pathogens, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
so on. Secondly, the conditions for meaningful self-development and agency need to be 
constructed (largely in the form of positive support and negative restriction): there needs to 
be sufficient trust and confidence in one’s fellow agents, together with sufficient 
predictability to plan, so as to operate in a way that is interactive and purposeful rather than 
merely defensive. Fear, as Robert Nozick famously highlighted, can have a corrosive impact 
on agency.23 Thirdly, there need to be conditions for the moral development of agents as well 
as for the practising of moral agency—that is to say, the moral segment of the commons 
features both developmental and opportunity conditions. 
Now, the point about these three bottom lines is that they are conceived of as being pre-
competitive or pre-conflictual; the tensions, competing demands, purposes and priorities that 
characterise much social life are all to come. These bottom line ‘pre-conditions’ (whatever 
they are agreed to be) are, by definition, neutral as between one human and another, between 
one agent and another, and between one agent with moral aspirations and another (or, 
between one moral viewpoint and another).24 These are pre-conditions that represent a 
‘commons’ that reflects the needs of all humans, irrespective of their particular projects and 
plans as agents, and irrespective of their particular moral beliefs. If, during the course of 
deliberative democratic debate, anyone proposes that smart machines should be licensed to 
operate in ways that might compromise any of these bottom-line conditions, regulators 
should treat such a proposal as wholly ‘unreasonable’. Of course, determining the nature of 
these conditions will not be a mechanical process and I do not assume that it will be without 
its points of controversy.25 Nevertheless, let me give an indication of how I would understand 
the distinctive contribution of each segment of the commons and then explain how I see 
human dignity fitting into the picture.   
First, the commons must secure the essential conditions for human existence—that is, for an 
ecosystem that is capable of supporting human life. At minimum, this entails that the physical 
well-being of humans must be secured; humans need oxygen, they need food and water, they 
need shelter, they need protection against contagious diseases, if they are sick they need 
whatever medical treatment is available, and they need to be protected against assaults by 
other humans or non-human beings. It follows that the intentional violation of such 
conditions is a crime against, not just the individual humans who are directly affected, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ecology and Society 32 (http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/) (last accessed November 
14, 2016). See, too, Kate Raworth’s notion of ‘doughnut’ economics: 
http://www.kateraworth.com/doughnut/ (last accessed November 14, 2016). 
 
23  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell, 1974). 
 
24  But, note my caveats in n 20. 
 
25  Moreover, even if it is agreed where the bottom lines are to be drawn, a community still has to decide 
how to handle proposals for uses of smart machines that do not present a threat to any of the bottom 
line conditions. 
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humanity itself.26 If we limit the essential conditions for human existence to such survival 
resources, this is compatible with both a good deal of psychological distress as well as 
restrictions on human freedom (the former possibly stemming from the latter). If smart 
machines were to enslave humans, and possibly keep a few well-maintained human 
specimens as exhibits in a zoo, this would be a fundamental violation of human agency but 
not of the essential conditions for human existence. On the other hand, ML employed in 
weapons of mass destruction would be a clear case of a violation of these essential 
conditions. 
Secondly, there are the generic conditions for human agency. Let me assume that the 
distinctive capacities of prospective agents include being able: 
• to freely choose one’s own ends, goals, purposes and so on (‘to do one’s own thing’) 
• to understand instrumental reason 
• to prescribe rules (for oneself and for others) and to be guided by rules (set by oneself 
or by others) 
• to form a sense of one’s own identity (‘to be one’s own person’). 
Accordingly, the essential conditions are those that support the exercise of these capacities. 
With existence secured, and under the right conditions, human life becomes an opportunity 
for agents to be who they want to be, to have the projects that they want to have, to form the 
relationships that they want, to pursue the interests that they choose to have and so on. In the 
twenty-first century, no other view of human potential and aspiration is plausible; in the 
twenty-first century, it is axiomatic that humans are prospective agents and that agents need 
to be free. 
The gist of these agency conditions is nicely expressed in a recent paper from the Royal 
Society and British Academy where, in a discussion of data governance and privacy, we read 
that: 
Future concerns will likely relate to the freedom and capacity to create conditions in 
which we can flourish as individuals; governance will determine the social, political, 
legal and moral infrastructure that gives each person a sphere of protection through 
which they can explore who they are, with whom they want to relate and how they 
want to understand themselves, free from intrusion or limitation of choice.27 
In this light, we can readily appreciate that what is dystopian about George Orwell’s 198428 
and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World 29is not that human existence is compromised but that 
                                                          
26  Compare Roger Brownsword, ‘Crimes Against Humanity, Simple Crime, and Human Dignity’ in  
Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias, and Wouter Werner (eds), Humanity across International Law and 
Biolaw (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 87-114. 
27  The Royal Society and British Academy, Connecting Debates on the Governance of Data and its Uses 
(London, December 2016) 5.  
 
28  (Penguin Books, 1954) (first published 1949). 
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human agency is compromised.30 We can appreciate, too, that today’s dataveillance practices, 
as much as 1984’s surveillance, ‘may be doing less to deter destructive acts than [slowly to 
narrow] the range of tolerable thought and behaviour.’31 
Thirdly, where human agents have moral aspirations, the commons must secure the 
conditions for a moral community. Agents who reason impartially will understand that each 
human agent is a stakeholder in the commons that protects the essential conditions for human 
existence together with the generic conditions of agency; and that these conditions must, 
therefore, be respected. Beyond these conditions, the moral aspiration is to do the right thing 
relative not simply to one’s own interests but relative to the interests that other human agents 
might have. While respect for the commons’ conditions is binding on all human agents, these 
conditions do not rule out the possibility of moral contestation and moral pluralism. Rather, 
these are pre-conditions for moral debate and discourse, giving each agent the opportunity to 
develop his or her own view of what is morally prohibited, permitted, or required in relation 
to those acts, activities and practices that are predicated on the existence of the commons. 
2.2 Human dignity 
How does human dignity enter into this picture? I suggest that it enters at two points—or, 
better, at two levels.  
First, we can understand the idea of respect for human dignity as a demand that there is 
respect for the essential pre-conditions for the development and practice of moral agency (in 
other words, respect for the third of the bottom lines). As a shorthand, let us call this ‘HD1’. 
Elaborating this notion, we would treat the distinctive value (or dignity) of humans as 
residing in their capacity to appreciate the importance of doing the right thing and then acting 
on that understanding. To the extent that human dignity is understood to be a virtue, it is the 
virtue of freely trying to do the right thing for the right reason. Because human dignity, so 
conceived, is impartial between agents who contest the criterion for doing the right thing, it 
sets a particular bottom line for any regulatory or social licence for machine learning. What is 
dystopian about Anthony Burgess’ A Clockwork Orange32, and what is at least worrying 
about the supposed utopia of B.F. Skinner’s Walden Two33, is that those who do the right 
thing—whether reformed criminals or young children—do not seem to have any choice in the 
matter.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
29  (Vintage Books, 2007) (first published 1932). 
 
30  To be sure, there might be some doubt about whether the regulation of particular acts should be treated 
as a matter of the existence conditions or the agency conditions. For present purposes, however, 
resolving such a doubt is not a high priority. The important question is whether we are dealing with a 
bottom-line condition. 
 
31  Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society (Harvard University Press, 2015) at 52. 
 
32   (Penguin Books, 1972) (first published 1962). 
 
33  (Hackett Publishing Company Inc, reprinted 2005) (first published 1948). 
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Secondly, human dignity might enter the picture once again where it is put forward within 
moral discourse as the substantive criterion for doing the right thing. For present purposes, I 
will assume that such appeals to human dignity are either rights-based, the idea being that 
human dignity ‘constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights’34 (for short, we can call this 
‘HD2a’), or duty-based, the idea being that human dignity is the source of duties that humans 
owe not only to other humans but also to their communities and to themselves (for short, we 
can call this ‘HD2b’).  
On this analysis, the general question of whether any applications of ML present a threat to 
human dignity translates into two more specific questions. First, will the application 
compromise the bottom line conditions for moral community (i.e., HD1)? Secondly, is the 
application compatible with human dignity as the particular standard of doing the right thing 
(i.e., HD2a or HD2b)? Whereas all human agents who have moral aspirations will accept that 
there can be no compromising of the former, their views in relation to the latter will depend 
upon how they understand the relationship between human dignity and the particular criterion 
of right action.35 
It remains only to say that, while there are many questions on which proponents of HD2a 
differ from proponents of HD2b, they must agree that humans have a moral responsibility to 
respect the bottom-line conditions. Hence, if some act or activity or technological application 
compromises any part of these conditions, it necessarily will involve a violation of both 
HD2a and HD2b; and, if it is the conditions for moral development and opportunity that are 
compromised, then HD1 is also distinctively engaged.  
2.3 Unrestricted and restricted moralism 
This leaves a question that I will not pursue in this paper but which I want to flag up as 
needing further attention. The question is whether there might be some differences between 
moralists as to whether a technological fix, rather than a rule, may be legitimately employed 
to protect the existence and agency conditions.  
Briefly, what I have in mind is a possible distinction between (i) ‘unrestricted moralists’ who 
hold that human agents should aspire to do the right thing for the right reason in relation to all 
acts, including acts that concern the commons’ conditions themselves, and (ii) ‘restricted 
moralists’ who hold that this moral aspiration is fully engaged only in relation to acts that, 
while relying on the commons, do not directly impact on the commons’ conditions 
themselves. Let me emphasise that those who take a restricted approach are not disputing that 
                                                          
34  As the matter is expressed in the explanatory notes to Article 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (see http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/1-human-dignity) (last accessed November 2, 
2016). 
 
35  Arguably, the generic conditions for agency already presuppose not only the conditions for moral 
development and opportunity but a particular set of substantive rights-based moral principles (along the 
lines of HD2a). Seminally, see Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (University of Chicago Press, 
1978); and Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality (University of Chicago Press, 
1991). However, for present purposes, so long as it is accepted that regulators are dealing with a 
context of moral aspiration, it is not critical to cash this argument. 
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we have moral rights and responsibilities in relation to either the existence or the agency 
conditions, and that there are overwhelming moral reasons for prioritising the protection and 
preservation of the commons, indeed that these are core human responsibilities.  
To illustrate the difference between these two degrees of moralism, let us assume that, in a 
particular community, the core rules of the criminal law are treated as instruments that are 
designed to secure the commons’ (agency) conditions. Now, when modern technologies of 
surveillance and DNA-identification are adopted in support of these laws, unrestricted 
moralists will be concerned that the amplification of prudential reasons for compliance might 
result in the crowding out of moral reasons. When the use of technology is taken a stage 
further, such that ‘non-compliance’ is prevented and ‘compliance’ is technologically forced, 
agents no longer reason in terms of what they ought to do, neither prudentially nor morally. 
For unrestricted moralists, this is a move in the wrong direction; HD1 is compromised. 
However, for those who take a restricted view, a technological fix for the sake of the 
existence or agency pre-conditions is not necessarily a problem.36 
Having drawn this distinction, two questions arise. First, is there any rational basis for the 
(unrestricted moralist) view that, even where rules do not work in protecting the commons’ 
conditions and where technological management might fix the problem, the priority is still to 
try freely to do the right thing? Secondly, does the restricted view leave much significant 
space for agents to debate what is morally required and for agents to do the right thing for the 
right reason? These are large questions that I have to leave for another day. 
3. Machine Learning, Consumer Recommender Systems, Personal Digital Assistants 
and Cyberbutlers 
In the early days of e-commerce, in a prescient article,37 Richard Ford anticipated the 
profiling of consumer preferences and the servicing of one’s consumption needs by 
automated processes, or by something akin to a ‘cyberbutler’. Imagining such a future, Ford 
foresaw that a consumer would sign over their paycheck to the cyberbutler who would hold it 
in trust for the consumer’s benefit; then, guided by the consumer’s profile, the cyberbutler 
would place appropriate orders so that, each day, the consumer would ‘come home to a 
selection of healthy and nutritious groceries from webvan.com or a Paul Smith shirt from 
boo.com or the latest Chemical Brothers CD from cdnow.com’.38 However, Ford’s 
cyberbutlers, like today’s recommender systems, go one step beyond repeat ordering. 
                                                          
36  For these changes in the regulatory registers, see Roger Brownsword, ‘Lost in Translation: Legality, 
Regulatory Margins, and Technological Management’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
1321. And, for the general question of whether we should try to eliminate the possibility of offending, 
compare Michael L. Rich, ‘Should We Make Crime Impossible?’ (2013) 36 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy 795. 
 
37  Richard T. Ford, ‘Save the Robots: Cyber Profiling and Your So-Called Life’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law 
Review 1572. 
 
38  Richard Ford (n 37) at 1578. By now, the cyberbutler would have changed to different suppliers of 
groceries, shirts, and CDs (webvan.com and boo.com being spectacular dot.com failures, and a 
declining cdnow.com being purchased by Amazon). 
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Additionally, they ‘will suggest books I’ll enjoy reading, recordings I’ll like to listen to, 
restaurants I’ll be glad I tried, even if I wouldn’t have chosen any of them on my own.’39 
While some of these suggestions will coincide with my likes, others will not; but, the more 
that my preferences are revealed and used to refine the profile, the better my ML 
recommender systems will become in tailoring their advice. If these systems constantly 
improve, is there anything to cause human agents concern? If the recommendations got worse 
(in the sense of being further from our preferences or simply inappropriate given our age, 
needs, and interests) they might be a nuisance; but, if they get better, almost to the point that 
the profilers seem to know me better than I know myself, should we worry? And, if so, is it 
the compromising of human dignity that should be the reason for our worry? 
To this, my short answer is that there might be issues here about the ideal conditions for 
human agency to flourish40 as well as for the welfare of consumers.41 Moreover, for those 
moralists who subscribe to either HD2a or HD2b, there might be some particular uses of 
PDAs that give rise to dignitarian concern.42 However, there is also a more systemic concern: 
this is that, while recommender systems promise to give agents more options of the kind that 
they generally like to have and, to this extent, expand agent choices, there might be some 
inhibition on changing one’s preferences and, thus, modifying the kind of person that one 
wants to be. In other words, such systems raise the question of whether there is a risk that 
consumers might become trapped in their own (machine learning-assisted) personal ‘echo-
chambers’, and whether this risk needs to be managed.43 The thought is that those consumers 
who simply want to experiment or change their profiles might find it difficult to do so. The 
challenge for society is to find a way of balancing the preferences of those agents who are 
perfectly happy to receive recommendations that point them towards more of the same 
against the preferences of those who wish to try different things. 
This is not, however, the end of the matter: for, as Mireille Hildebrandt has argued, human 
agents who use a PDA will find that they are living in ‘an onlife world’ in which their 
cyberbutlers also operate as agents.44 To aid our imagination of what it might be like to live 
                                                          
39  Richard Ford (n 37) at 1576. 
 
40  Compare, e.g., Sherry Turkle, Alone Together (Basic Books, 2011). 
 
41  See the excellent analysis in Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, Virtual Competition (Harvard 
University Press, 2016). 
 
42  For a recent story that might trouble those who subscribe to HD2b, see Mark Bridge, ‘Forget real 
women: men turn to Siri for their sexual thrills’ The Times, October 27, 2016, p. 3. 
 
43  See, e.g., European Data Protection Supervisor, Towards a New Digital Ethics (Opinion 4/2015) 11 
September, 2015, at 13: 
 
 Profiles used to predict people’s behaviour risk stigmatisation, reinforcing collective stereotypes, social 
and cultural segregation and exclusion, with such ‘collective intelligence’ subverting individual choice 
and equal opportunities. Such ‘filter bubbles’ or ‘personal echo-chambers’ could end up stifling the 
very creativity, innovation and freedoms of expression and association which have enabled digital 
technologies to flourish. 
 
44  Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
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in such a world, Hildebrandt introduces us to ‘Diana’, a sales representative for a large hotel 
conglomerate, whose life is organised by a PDA ‘that is distributed between [Diana’s] smart 
phone, the system running her smart house, the smart car, her ubiquitous computing office 
platform, while being on speaking terms with other systems, like those for traffic control and 
healthcare, commercial and governmental service providers, as well as monitoring systems 
for private and public safety and security’.45  
At first blush, the use of such PDAs might seem to be unproblematic. If Diana chooses to rely 
on her PDA, how does this challenge human dignity? However, if it turns out that Diana’s 
freedom to use her PDA is more apparent than real, her ‘consent’ might not be adequate to 
authorise the kind of exploitation of her personal data that might trouble advocates of HD2a. 
More importantly, we need to take a harder look at the way in which Diana relies on her 
PDA. In particular, what if Diana comes to rely on her PDA to analyse her moral dilemmas 
and determine how she should act? For those who belong to an aspirant moral community, it 
is axiomatic that each agent should develop a sense of what it is to do the right thing for the 
right reason, and try always to do just that. Human dignity involves more than merely acting 
in line with the right thing; the paradigmatic expression of the dignity of humans is in doing 
what an agent judges to be the right thing even where there is an opportunity to do the wrong 
thing. In the light of this, it is one thing for agents to use their PDA as a moral ‘critical 
friend’, quite another to rely habitually on the PDA’s moral expertise or self-consciously to 
delegate moral decision-making to their PDA; and, similarly, it is one thing for an agent 
freely to comply with legal rules but quite another (in techno-managed environments) to have 
no practical option other than to comply with the constraints imposed by whatever 
technological measures have been adopted. Where agents no longer freely make and act on 
their moral judgments, we should question whether the conditions for moral community—
and, concomitantly, for human dignity (as HD1)—are being compromised.46 
In these short remarks, there are, at least, two invitations to engage precaution. First, once an 
agent regularly finds the moral advice offered by their PDA, not just reasonable but 
compelling, is there a danger that they will routinely rely on, or even delegate moral decision-
making to, the PDA? As Harari remarks when discussing the evolutionary trajectory of 
systems such as Microsoft’s ‘Cortana’, Google’s ‘Now’ and Apple’s ‘Siri’, we might find 
that, instead of humans having authority, there has been a transfer to non-human 
algorithms.47 To be sure, we should be wary of arguments that invoke ‘slippery slopes’: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
45  Hildebrandt (n 44) at 1. 
 
46  For cautionary thoughts about the ‘cyber effect’ (particularly the tendency to amplify and escalate an 
agent’s off-line behaviour), see Mary Aiken (n 18) passim. 
 
47  Harari (n 5), at 342-345; and, at 395, Harari repeats his caution that ‘once authority shifts from humans 
to algorithms, the humanist projects may become irrelevant.’ Compare, too, Robin Marantz Henig, 
‘Death by Robots’ The New York Times Magazine (January 9, 2015) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/magazine/death-by-robot.html (last accessed November 8, 2016), 
who cautions that it might not be wise to outsource ‘morality to robots as easily as we’ve outsourced so 
many other forms of human labour’. 
 
14 
 
nevertheless, if this is the direction of travel, and if reversing it is not possible, then as 
humans with moral aspirations we have a common interest in taking precautionary 
measures.48 
The second invitation raises more general concerns about a tendency to rely on technologies, 
rather than rules, in order to manage risk. One concern is that technological management 
interferes with the possibility of agents freely doing the right thing for the right reason— 
moral virtue, as Ian Kerr has neatly expressed it, is not to be automated.49. That said, the 
precise nature, and scope of, this pathology needs further inquiry.50 This leads to a related 
concern about whether we can identify the point at which use of technological management 
might crowd out moral reason. Unless we can do so, how do we know whether a particular 
employment of ML will make any significant difference to the context that is presupposed by 
moral community? After all, there is no reason to think that, in previous centuries, the fitting 
of locks on doors, or the installing of safes, and the like, has fatally compromised the 
conditions for moral community. Even allowing for the greater sophistication, variety, and 
density of technological management in the present century, together with the smartest of 
smart machines, will this make a material difference? Surely, it might be protested, there still 
will be sufficient occasions left over for agents freely to do the right thing and to do it for the 
right reason as well as to oppose regulation that offends their conscience or to engage in acts 
of civil disobedience.51 On the other hand, what we are contemplating is concerted 
technological management by the State, not isolated private initiatives;52 and, as we all know, 
turning up the temperature from cool, to warm, to hot, might also be just a matter of degree, 
but it does not follow that we are comfortable at all points on the scale. Accordingly, it will 
be for each community with moral aspirations to make its own assessment of the conditions 
that are required for it to flourish and, where there is uncertainty about this matter, it will 
need to judge how precautionary it should be in licensing the use of technological regulation. 
4. Machine Learning: Autonomous Vehicles and Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
In this part of the paper, I turn to the implications of ML in two apparently very different 
settings: first, the use of ML in autonomous (road traffic) vehicles; and, secondly, the use of 
ML in lethal autonomous weapons systems. While autonomous vehicles are designed for safe 
                                                          
48  See, too, the argument in Millar and Kerr (n 12) (where it might become morally problematic for 
humans not to defer to the ‘expertise’ of smart machines). 
 
49  See, Ian Kerr, ‘Digital Locks and the Automation of Virtue’ in Michael Geist (ed), From ‘Radical 
Extremism’ to ‘Balanced Copyright’: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Irwin Law, 2010) 
247-303. 
 
50  See my closing remarks in section 2.3; and see, further, Roger Brownsword, ‘Law as a Moral 
Judgment, the Domain of Jurisprudence, and Technological Management’ in Patrick Capps and Shaun 
D. Pattinson (eds), Ethical Rationalism and the Law (Hart, 2016) 109-130. 
51  Nb the discussion in Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here (Allen Lane, 2013) at 2-4-205 
(discussing the case of Rosa Parks). 
 
52  Compare Rich (n 36). 
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use on the highways, autonomous weapons systems are designed to be lethal; while the 
former are intended for peaceful civilian use, the latter are designed for hostile use by the 
military. Nevertheless, there is a common element, namely, that in both cases the design of 
the machine, and the incorporation of ML, might mean that it will operate in ways that make 
decisions about whether a human lives or dies. In both cases, it might be argued that, for the 
sake of human dignity, where a human life is to be taken, the decision to take it should be 
made by a fellow human. 
4.1 Autonomous vehicles 
In the early debates about the social licensing and regulation of autonomous vehicles, a 
common question has been: how would such a vehicle deal with a moral dilemma53—for 
example, the kind of dilemma presented by the trolley problem (where one option is to kill or 
injure one innocent human and the only other option is to kill or injure more than one 
innocent human)54 or by the tunnel problem (where the choice is between killing a passenger 
in the vehicle and a child outside the vehicle)55? For example, no sooner had it been reported 
that Uber were to pilot driverless taxis in Pittsburg than just these questions were raised.56 Let 
me suggest a number of ways of responding to such questions, leading to the conclusion that, 
while the trolley problem is not itself a serious difficulty, there is a significant question—
more effectively raised by the tunnel problem—to be asked about the way in which moral 
responses are programmed into autonomous vehicles or other smart technologies. 
A first, and short, response is that the particular moral dilemma presented by the trolley 
problem (at any rate, as I have described it) is open to only two plausible answers. A moralist 
will either say that killing just the one person is clearly the lesser of two evils and is morally 
required; or it will be argued that, because the loss of one innocent life weighs as heavily as 
the loss of many innocent lives, neither option is better than the other—from which it follows 
that killing just the one person is neither better nor (crucially) worse, morally speaking, than 
killing many. Accordingly, if autonomous vehicles are programmed to minimise the number 
of humans who are killed or injured, this is either right in line with one strand of moral 
                                                          
53  See, e.g., Patrick Lin, ‘The Ethics of Saving Lives with Autonomous Cars are Far Murkier than You 
Think’ WIRED, 30 July, 2013: available at https://www.wired.com/2013/07/the-surprising-ethics-of-
robot-cars/ (accessed November 15, 2016); and, ‘The Robot Car of Tomorrow May be Just 
Programmed to Hit You’ WIRED, 6 May 2014: available at https://www.wired.com/2014/05/the-robot-
car-of-tomorrow-might-just-be-programmed-to-hit-you/ (last accessed November 15, 2016). 
54  For the original, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘The Trolley Problem’ (1985) 94 Yale Law Journal 1395.  
 
55  For the tunnel problem in relation to autonomous vehicles, see Jason Millar, ‘You should have a say in 
your robot car’s code of ethics’ Wired 09.02.2014 (available at: https://www.wired.com/2014/09/set-
the-ethics-robot-car/) (last accessed, February 3, 2017). See, further, Meg Leta Jones and Jason Millar, 
‘Hacking Metaphors in the Anticipatory Governance of Emerging Technology: The Case of Regulating 
Robots’ in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (n 11) (forthcoming). 
 
56  See, e.g., Will Pavia, ‘Driverless Ubers take to road’ The Times, September 13, 2016, p36; and, 
Raphael Hogarth, ‘Driverless cars will take us into a moral maze’ The Times, September 17, 2016, p 
28. 
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thinking or, following the other, at least no worse than any other programming. Such a design 
would be opposed only by someone who argued that the vehicle should be set up to kill more 
rather than fewer humans; and, barring some quite exceptional circumstances, that, surely, is 
simply not a plausible moral view. 
Secondly, if autonomous vehicles were designed to minimise the number of human deaths or 
injuries, it is hard to believe that human drivers, acting on their on-the-spot moral judgments, 
would do any better. It is hard to believe, in other words, that having a human decision-maker 
in the loop would better serve respect for human dignity. Confronted by a trolley scenario, 
with little or no time to make a moral assessment of the situation, human drivers would act 
instinctively—and, insofar as human drivers formed any sense of what would be the right 
thing to do in the particular situation, my guess is that they would generally try to minimise 
the loss of life.57 What other defensible response could there be? 
Thirdly, even if—at least in the case of autonomous vehicles—there is a reasonably 
straightforward resolution of the trolley problem, there might well be more difficult cases. 
Some might think that we face such a case if the choice is between sacrificing innocent 
passengers in an autonomous vehicle or killing innocent humans outside the vehicle. 
However, in principle, this does not seem any more difficult: minimising the loss of human 
life still seems like the appropriate default principle. In the case of the tunnel problem, 
though, where one life will be lost whichever choice is made, the default principle is not 
determinative. Secondary defaults might be suggested—for example, it might be suggested 
that, because the cars present a new and added risk, those who travel in the cars should be 
sacrificed58—but I am ready to concede that this is a case where moralists might reasonably 
disagree. Moreover, beyond such genuinely difficult cases, there might be some issues where 
human agents do have time for moral reflection and where we think that it is important that 
they form their own view; and there might be cases where there are plausible conflicting 
options and where moralists want to see this resolved in whatever way aligns with their own 
moral judgment.  
If we make the perhaps optimistic assumption that autonomous vehicles will be programmed 
in ways that reflect the terms of the social licence agreed by the members of the community 
in which they will operate, agents will have an opportunity to formulate and express their 
own moral views as the licence is negotiated and debated. Already, the Open Roboethics 
Initiative is exploring imaginative ways of crowd-sourcing public views on acceptable 
behaviour by robots, even in relation to such everyday questions as whether a robot should 
                                                          
57  Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan, ‘The social dilemma of autonomous 
vehicles’ (2016) 352 Science (Issue 6293) 1573-1576. 
 
58  Of course, if this is the accepted default, and even if it is accepted that this is the right thing to do, some 
humans might be reluctant to travel on these terms. And, it might be that the general safety features of 
the vehicle are such that it simply cannot default to sacrificing its passengers: see e.g. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3837453/Mercedes-Benz-says-driverless-cars-hit-child-street-
save-passengers-inside.html (last accessed October 31, 2016). 
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give way to a human or vice versa.59 Given such active moral engagement with the design of 
autonomous vehicles and the use of ML, what is the import for human dignity? 
First, and most significantly for the present discussion, the fact that human operators might 
not be in the loop at the time that an autonomous vehicle deals with whatever trolley or 
tunnel problems it might encounter does not necessarily equate to humans ceding their life-
and-death moral judgments to machines. Provided that autonomous vehicles are designed and 
programmed in accordance with the terms of the social licence that has been agreed for their 
operation—reflecting not only the community’s judgment as to what is an ‘acceptable’ 
balance of risk and benefit but also its judgment as to what is morally appropriate—humans 
are not compromising their dignity by abdicating their moral responsibilities. Humans, in 
negotiating the social licence for autonomous vehicles, are debating and judging what is the 
right thing in relation to the moral programming of the vehicle.  
Secondly, where there is only one plausible design (as I have suggested with regard to the 
minimisation of the loss of human life), and where that design is mandated by the agreed 
social licence, that might seem to be the end of the matter. What, though, if it were to be 
argued that, in order to reinforce the importance of freely doing the right thing and expressing 
one’s human dignity, passengers who enter autonomous vehicles should have the opportunity 
to override the default? On the face of it, this is a hostage to fortune.60 Nevertheless, if a 
moral community is anxious to preserve opportunities for agents to do the wrong (sic) thing, 
this proposal might be taken seriously. In such a community, it might be thought that this is 
how the design of the vehicle is rendered compatible with HD1, underlining the importance 
of agents freely making and acting on their own moral judgments. Machines must be 
designed to give humans the choice, even the choice to do the wrong thing. 
Thirdly, relative to the opportunity conditions required by HD1, it might be argued that 
vehicles should not be designed in ways that preclude the possibility of doing the right thing 
(such as stopping to undertake ‘Good Samaritan’ acts of assistance). This implies that the 
design needs to allow for a human override to enable the vehicle’s passengers to respond to a 
moral emergency (such as rushing a person who urgently needs medical attention to the 
nearest hospital). Such contingencies might be provided for by the terms of the social licence.  
Fourthly, where there is more than one plausible design—for example, where the question 
concerns the relative priority of the interests of passengers and non-passengers—and where 
the background debate reveals a plurality of views, it might be thought that each user of 
autonomous vehicles should be required either to confirm the default or to input their own 
                                                          
59  See, e.g., AJung Moon, Ergun Calisgan, Camilla Bassani, Fausto Ferreira, Fiorella Operto, Gianmarco 
Veruggio, Elizabeth A. Croft, and H.F. Machiel Van der Loos, ‘The Open Roboethics Initiative and the 
Elevator-Riding Robot’ in Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin, and Ian Kerr (eds), Robot Law (Elgar, 
2016) 131-162. 
 
60  Compare, Patrick Lin, ‘Here’s a Terrible Idea: Robot Cars with Adjustable Ethics Settings’ WIRED, 18 
August 2014: available at https://www.wired.com/2014/08/heres-a-terrible-idea-robot-cars-with-
adjustable-ethics-settings/ (last accessed November 15, 2016). 
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favoured moral view.61 In other words, where there are conflicting options, it will not do for 
humans to leave it to the machine. Just as Diana should not leave it to her PDA to make the 
moral choices for her, she should not leave it to an autonomous vehicle to make those choices 
for her where there is more than one plausible option.  
Finally, there might be some design questions that set the rights-based conception of human 
dignity (HD2a) against the duty-based conception (HD2b). For example, some autonomous 
vehicles might be geared to assist humans who wish to end their lives. While advocates of 
HD2a will view this as morally permissible (as designed for the facilitation of ‘death with 
dignity’), advocates of HD2b will take the opposite view. Which of these views prevails will 
depend on the relative strength of the rival camps in the community and the ebb and flow of 
the political and legal debates. However, there is nothing new in any of this. Although, in this 
hypothetical case, autonomous vehicles now find themselves caught up in debates about 
assisted dying and human dignity, these debates are no different to those that raged around Dr 
Jack Kevorkian and his van of death.  
4.2 Lethal autonomous weapons systems 
Understandably, there is a great deal of concern about the development of lethal autonomous 
weapons (however we might choose to define such a weapon—perhaps as one that is not 
subject to ‘meaningful human control’).62 What, though, should we make of the argument 
that autonomous weapons represent a particular threat to human dignity?63 Is there a material 
difference between autonomous weapons and, say, autonomous road traffic vehicles (which 
might be regarded as another kind of killing machine)? Is being killed by an unmanned drone 
less dignified than being slaughtered by machine gun fire on the battlefields of warring 
nations? In response, let me offer four short remarks. 
First, the context for the use of autonomous weapons is quite different to any other context 
that we have considered. Crucially, warfare and weaponry, whether autonomous or not, 
                                                          
61  Compare the argument in Millar (n 55). 
 
62  For helpful general overviews, see, Peter Asaro, ‘Jus nascendi, robotic weapons and the Martens 
Clause’ in Calo et al (n 12) 367; and Kenneth Anderson and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Debating 
Autonomous Weapon Systems, their Ethics and their Regulation under International Law’ in 
Brownsword, Scotford, and Yeung (n 11) (DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199680832.013.33). For 
international concern, see the CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 
(LAWS), April 13-17, at the United Nations, Geneva: available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6CE049BE22EC75A2C1257C8D00513E26?Ope
nDocument (last accessed November 9, 2016); and, for concern in the United Kingdom, see the House 
of Commons’ debate on June 17, 2013: available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130617/debtext/130617-0004.htm 
(last accessed November 4, 2016). 
 
63  As Asaro (n 62) puts it at 385. 
 
For the killing of a human to be meaningful, it must be intentional. That is, it must be done for reason 
and purpose…But this also relates to the question of human dignity. If a combatant is to die with 
dignity, there must be some sense in which that death is meaningful. In the absence of an intentional 
and meaningful decision to use violence, the resulting deaths are meaningless and arbitrary, and the 
dignity of those killed is significantly diminished. 
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involve the systematic compromising of both the existence and the agency conditions of the 
commons. Moreover, we can take it that the conditions for moral development are also likely 
to be seriously compromised by the hostilities. Anyone who doubts the catastrophic impact of 
modern warfare on both the military and the civilian population need only glance at the state 
of the commons in the war zones of the Middle East. It follows that warfare and weaponry 
are prima facie incompatible with respect for the commons and it will be very difficult to 
justify engaging in such systematic destructive activities unless such actions (and the 
deployment of lethal weapons) can be shown to be quite clearly the lesser of two evils 
relative to the defence of the commons’ conditions. In other words, even if we subtract lethal 
autonomous weapons systems from the arsenal, we are still likely to find that warfare 
amounts to a violation of HD1. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the special nature of warfare, there is some similarity between 
autonomous vehicles that make life and death decisions and lethal autonomous weapons 
systems. That similarity is most apparent at the moment when the machine operates in a way 
that means a human life is lost (whether sacrificing a child in a tunnel or a passenger in the 
car or killing a soldier in a war zone). From the point of view of human dignity, we have 
suggested that it is important that the conditions for the moral development of human agents 
are not compromised by an over-reliance on the moral decision-making of machines. Humans 
must take responsibility for the designs that they embed in machines as well as for what they 
leave to machines and what they reserve to themselves. In other words, although at the 
moment when a machine takes a human life it does so without a human operator being 
proximately involved or ‘in control’, we need to view the machine in the larger picture of its 
development by human agents. In that larger picture, the critical period is the negotiation of 
the social licence for the use of ML, autonomously or non-autonomously. Accordingly, in 
this respect, the question of whether HD1 is compromised by a killing machine is the same 
whether that machine is a vehicle or a lethal weapon. 
Thirdly, we might subscribe to the view that, even in war, there are codes of honour that 
apply. Inevitably, in war, lives will be lost, prisoners will be taken, and so on; but the codes 
lay down standards that aim to ensure that combatants are treated with dignity, specifying 
how soldiers should (or should not) be killed, how, as prisoners, they should be treated, and 
how civilians should be treated, and so on. These specifications, I assume, are to some extent 
contingent; and, in some places and at some times, it is conceivable that the use of (or the 
particular design of) lethal autonomous weapons systems might be regarded as contrary to the 
prevailing understanding of human dignity. To the extent that the use of autonomous 
weapons is so understood, their use will be interpreted as a violation of either HD2a (if this is 
seen as a human rights issue) or perhaps HD2b (if, for example, this is understood as a 
question of solidarity or the like). 
Fourthly, from the perspective of both HD2a and HD2b, there might be a concern that, if 
humans are not in the loop when machines take human life, this might lead indirectly to a 
20 
 
lowering of respect for human life64—and, particularly so, if the use of such weapons spreads 
into the policing of civilians.65 This is an argument that might have traction in some contexts 
and, if it were to do so, it would clearly prompt concerns about the protection of the 
commons’ conditions, including concerns about moral development of the kind covered by 
HD1. 
4.3 Taking stock 
Where autonomous machines operate in ways that involve life and death decisions, there is a 
temptation to ask whether human dignity is compromised if a human is not, so to speak, in 
the loop at the time that such decisions are made. This, however, is not the right way to frame 
the issue. The question that we should ask is whether humans have designed the machine in 
such a way that, when the machine takes life, this is in line with the considered moral 
judgment of the designers and of the communities that endorse the use of such machines. 
Provided that this is the case, there is no objection that humans are abdicating their moral 
responsibilities or delegating moral decision-making to a machine. To be sure, quite apart 
from the special case of warfare, there are other concerns—in particular, where the design is 
morally controversial, humans should not be put in positions where they are implicated in the 
loss of a life that offends their conscience; and, in some cases, it might be thought important, 
for the sake of HD1, that each human has to confront a controversial moral question and act 
on their own judgment.  
5. Machine Learning and Profiling, Prediction, and Prevention in the Criminal Justice 
System 
While humans might know that smart machines are constantly building and revising profiles 
of them, they might not know precisely what the profile looks like or quite how it might be 
used—agents may not anticipate, for example, the way that intelligent machines used by 
insurers to assess risk might interpret the data derived from one’s Facebook pages,66 or the 
pervasive use of credit ratings in non-credit-related profiles.67 Even if innovation might be 
stifled if these systems were more transparent, and opened for challenge and review, Frank 
                                                          
64  For an analogous concern (that using weapons in entertainment and leisure contexts might brutalise 
humans so that the right to life is jeopardised) see Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-
GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn (Case C-36/02) (14 October, 2004); OJ C 300, 
04.12.2004 p.3. 
 
65  See, e.g., the Royal Society and British Academy (n 27) at 55: ‘Whilst this could be said to be a 
slippery slope argument, we know that bomb disposal robots came into civilian use from the military 
sector;  if lethal autonomous weapons are permitted in military service it seems inevitable that there 
will be creep into civilian use.’ 
 
66  Graeme Paton, ‘Insurers will identify risky drivers by checking their Facebook pages’ The Times, 
November 2, 2016, p. 4; but it seems that Facebook will resist this use, see Kevin Peachey, ‘Facebook 
blocks Admiral’s car insurance discount plan’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37847647 (last 
accessed November 4, 2016). 
 
67  Generally, see Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (Allen Lane, 2016). 
 
21 
 
Pasquale argues that any such concern is ‘more than outweighed by the threats to human 
dignity posed by pervasive, secret, and automated scoring systems.’68  
Given such threats, we might expect human agents to hesitate before licensing the use of 
smart machines to make profile-based decisions that risk-assess particular individuals and 
then implement risk management measures—for example, assessing an applicant for 
employment or insurance or credit as a ‘bad risk’ or as a ‘high risk’ and then either declining 
the application or granting it subject to certain conditions. Above all, we might expect 
humans to hesitate before endorsing the use of smart machines in the criminal justice system. 
Imagine a world of ‘actuarial justice’, a central precept of which is that ‘the system should be 
less concerned with traditional punishment based on downstream or after-the-fact goals such 
as retribution and rehabilitation. It should instead manage the risk presented by the dangerous 
and disorderly, using upstream or pre-emptive techniques of disruption, control, and 
containment.’69 Suppose, for example, that, any agent who wishes to travel by air is screened 
at the point of application for a ticket as well as being monitored when passing through the 
security zone at the airport. At any stage before boarding the plane, an individual can be 
denied—the machine says ‘no entry’ or ‘no fly’; and the decision to deny is made on the 
basis of ML technologies that profile the individual and that classify an agent’s behavioural 
characteristics in a certain way.70 Let us suppose that John Doe tries to purchase a ticket to 
fly from London to New York but he is turned down on the grounds that he has been assessed 
as too high a risk. If this assessment is ‘correct’, if John Doe would have tried to bring down 
the aircraft, we might ask whether anyone could reasonably object to such anticipatory 
preventive measures. If the assessment is incorrect, John Doe not presenting any such risk, or 
if it draws on data concerning, not Doe himself, but people to whom Doe seems to be similar, 
or if it incorporates racial or sexual biases, we might ask how anyone could reasonably think 
that this is fair and acceptable.  
                                                          
68  Pasquale (n 31) at 153. 
 
69  See Amber Marks, Ben Bowling, and Colman Keenan, ‘Automatic Justice? Technology, Crime, and 
Social Control’ in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (n 11) (forthcoming). For a 
seminal three-pronged critique of such an actuarial approach, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Against 
Prediction (The University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
 
70  According to Bill Davidow, writing in The Atlantic:  
An estimated 500 Americans have their names on no-fly lists. Thousands more are targeted for 
enhanced screening by the Automated Targeting System algorithm used by the Transportation Security 
Administration. By using data including "tax identification number, past travel itineraries, property 
records, physical characteristics, and law enforcement or intelligence information" the algorithm is 
expected to predict how likely a passenger is to be dangerous. 
See Bill Davidow, ‘Welcome to Algorithmic Prison’ The Atlantic, February 20, 2014 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/welcome-to-algorithmic-prison/283985/: last 
accessed December 9, 2016). 
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Even if intelligent machines are acceptable in some contexts, their adoption in the criminal 
justice system raises in an acute form the age-old question of the kind of society that we want 
to be. After all, as Tom Gash so aptly remarks, we need to understand that crime is ‘a risk 
that can be managed as well as a wrong to be condemned.’71  The question is: How far are we 
willing to accept the logic of a regime of crime control that relies on machine-learning 
powered risk assessment and risk management? Over and above the foundational concern 
that technological management of crime might compromise HD1 (by interfering with agents 
freely choosing to do the right thing), we can now identify some of the objections that might 
be raised by liberals and civil libertarians who advocate respect for due process and human 
rights, all underpinned by HD2a.72 Eschewing any attempt to be comprehensive about this, 
let me focus on concerns about the use of profiles to ground a character and risk-based 
attribution of criminal responsibility, about bias, about reliance on third-party data, about 
transparency, and about false positives.  
5.1 Profiles and character-based criminal responsibility 
In her most recent book, Nicola Lacey has sought to correct the view that the English 
criminal justice system has always been wedded to a capacity-based view of criminal 
responsibility—that is, holding agents responsible only where they subjectively intend to 
engage in acts that are prohibited or only where the agent has a fair opportunity to comply 
and fails to do so. On either view, 
the foundation of not only a person’s status as a responsible agent answerable to the 
normative demands of the criminal law but also of an attribution of responsibility for 
specific actions lies in human capacities of cognition—knowledge of circumstances, 
assessment of consequences—and volition—powers of self-control.73 
Although the capacity view enjoys considerable support, Lacey points out that it has long 
been in competition with various degrees of character-based responsibility, where judgments 
of criminal responsibility reflect ‘a judgment of bad or vicious character, or a wrongful, bad, 
                                                          
71  Tom Gash, Criminal: The Truth about Why People Do Bad Things (Allen Lane, 2016) at 25. 
 
72  Compare, e.g., Sir Guy Green, ‘Human Dignity and the Law’, in J. Malpas and N. Lickiss (eds.), 
Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Springer, 2007) 151-156, at 153:  
Principles…which directly or indirectly recognize and protect human dignity include: like 
cases must be treated alike; any curtailment of the freedom of an individual is prima facie 
unlawful unless justified by a positive law; a private person may do anything which is not 
prohibited or which does not infringe the rights of others; when it is making a decision 
affecting the interests of individuals a public authority is required to observe procedural 
fairness or natural justice and various presumptions of statutory interpretation designed to 
protect individual rights and freedoms. 
There is also a tendency to unpack human dignity in a way that condemns infringements of privacy and 
degrading conditions in prisons. See, e,g, Andrea Roth, ‘Trial by Machine’ (2016) 104 Georgetown 
Law Journal 1245, 1282-1284. Amongst many interesting suggestions, Roth proposes that, where 
agencies seek funding for the use of body-measuring devices or surveillance techniques, they should 
have to submit a ‘dignity impact statement’ (at 1303). 
73  Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 28. 
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disapproved character trait——a disregard of human life, indifference to sexual integrity, 
lack of respect for property rights, and so on.’74 If, rather than asking whether an individual 
freely chose to engage in criminal conduct, smart machines in the criminal justice system 
were to make risk-assessments based on the profiles that they have of individuals, this would 
imply a significant shift away from capacity-based responsibility. Instead, character, risk, and 
likely outcome, all assessed by reference to some profile, would become critical in 
identifying those who present a risk to social order. Anticipating this possible direction of 
travel, indicated by the development of intelligent machines, Lacey cautions: 
 More speculatively, and potentially more nightmarishly, new technologies in fields 
such as neuroscience and genetics, and computer programs that identify crime ‘hot 
spots’ that might be taken to indicate ‘postcode presumptive criminality’, have 
potential implications for criminal responsibility. They will offer, or perhaps threaten, 
yet more sophisticated mechanisms of responsibility-attribution based on notions of 
character essentialism combined with assessments of character-based risk, just as the 
emerging sciences of the mind, the brain, and statistics did in the late nineteenth 
century. Moreover, several of these new scientific classifications exhibit more 
extreme forms of character essentialism than did their nineteenth century forbears.75 
Clearly, implicit in these remarks, there is a script written by advocates of HD2a. For, it is 
HD2a in conjunction with human rights (to a fair trial, to due process, and so on) that 
underpins the capacity-based approach to criminal responsibility that is now potentially 
challenged by smart machines.  
5.2 Third-party data 
It might seem obvious that, when a smart machine is judging the character of John Doe, it 
should be referring to the profile of John Doe and not that of Richard Roe. Suppose, though, 
that John Doe, wishing to upgrade his smart car, applies for a credit facility but that he is 
turned down by a smart machine that classifies him as a bad risk. When John Doe challenges 
the decision, he learns that one of the previous occupiers of his house, one Richard Roe, had a 
record of non-payment of loans. But, why, Doe asks, should the credit record of an unrelated 
third-party, Roe, count against my application? Is that not unfair and irrational? To which the 
response is that the machine makes more accurate decisions when it uses third-party data in 
this way; and that, if such data were to be excluded from the calculation, the cost of credit 
would increase. 
In fact, this is not a novel issue. In the English case of CCN Systems Ltd v Data Protection 
Registrar,76 on facts of this kind, the tribunal held that, while it accepted that such third-party 
information might have general predictive value and utility, its use was unfair to the 
                                                          
74  Lacey (n 73) at 35. 
 
75  Lacey (n 73) at 170-171 (and for ‘outcome’, and ‘risk’-based ideas of responsibility, see Ch 2). 
 
76  Case DA/90 25/4/9, judgment delivered 25 February 1991. 
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individual and could not be permitted. Similarly, Doe might argue that he has been treated 
unfairly if his application for credit is successful but the terms and conditions of the facility 
reflect the fact that (because of unrelated third-party data) he is classified as a higher-than-
average risk; and, once again, the response will be that the costs of credit will be increased if 
such data is excluded. How is the choice to be made between the general utility of the credit 
algorithms and the unfairness of particular decisions? 
Now, while it is one thing for a smart machine to deny an agent access to credit, it is another 
matter for intelligent machines to make risk assessments in the criminal justice system where 
exclusionary or pre-emptive decisions are likely to have more serious consequences for 
agents. For example, smart machines might be deployed to initiate pre-emptive action against 
agents who are judged to be high risk, to deny bail to arrestees who are assessed as high risk, 
and to extend custodial terms for offenders who, at the point of release, are still judged to be 
‘dangerous’. If, in making these decisions, unrelated third-party data is used, this seems to be 
contrary to due process. Yet, in all these cases, smart machines churn out decisions that are in 
line with Benthamite principles and that are generated by the logic of big data but that depart 
from the ideal of a ‘justice’ system. 
What we have here, then, is not so much a conflict between HD2a and HD2b, but a conflict 
between, on the one hand, these deontological views of human dignity and, on the other, 
utilitarian principles that will endorse a system of crime control so long as it performs better 
than any rivals in maximising overall utility. The distress caused to Doe and others is not 
ignored; but it is treated as simply reducing the net utility of a system entrusted to smart 
machines (or of a system that has such machines operating alongside human decision-
makers).77 
5.3 Bias 
One of the arguments against character-based modes of responsibility is that an agent should 
not be held to account for features over which he or she has neither control nor choice. 
Accordingly, it is unfair to treat agents as suspicious or as tending towards criminality on the 
grounds of, say, their sex or their racial or ethnic origin; and, if behavioural geneticists 
become more confident about the significance of particular markers for various kinds of anti-
social conduct, we might find that this becomes the front-line in battles about unfair 
discrimination.78 At all events, if the data used by smart machines imports characteristics of 
                                                          
77  For a relatively favourable report on a bail tool developed by the Arnold Foundation, see Shaila 
Dewan, ‘Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail’ New York Times, 26 June 2015: 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-
science.html?_r=0 (last accessed November 15, 2016). According to Dewan, although the tool does not 
take into account some of the factors that human judges and prosecutors tend to treat as material (such 
as the defendant’s employment status, community ties, and a history of drug and alcohol abuse) it 
improves accuracy by focusing on fewer than ten factors (principally, age, criminal record, previous 
failures to appear in court) and by giving recent offences a greater weight. 
78  See, e.g., the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetics and Human Behaviour (London, October 2002); 
and Debra Wilson, Genetics, Crime and Justice (Edward Elgar, 2015) Ch 7. 
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this kind, then the decisions made (even if they have utility) will rightly agitate HD2a 
concerns about due process, equal treatment, and the like. 
Already, there are questions being raised in the US about the hidden racial bias of apparently 
colour-blind algorithms used for bail and sentencing decisions.79 The COMPAS tool that is at 
the centre of one particular storm uses more than one hundred factors (including age, sex and 
criminal history) to score defendants on a 1-10 scale: defendants scored 1-4 are treated as low 
risk; defendants with scores of 5-10 are treated as medium or high risk. Although the factors 
do not include race, it is alleged that the algorithms implicitly discriminate against black 
defendants by assigning them higher risk scores (largely because, as a class, they have 
significant criminal histories and higher rates of recidivism). This means that there are 
significantly more black than white false positives in those defendants who are classified as 
higher risk and who are then risk managed accordingly. 
5.4 Transparency 
To return to the credit application hypothetical, Doe at least knows that a decision has been 
made and, when he challenges the decision, he is given a reason. Things could be much less 
satisfactory: for example, Doe might not be told that his application has been rejected (he 
simply gets no response or some misleading reply), or he is given no reason for the decision, 
or he is told (quite honestly) that it is not possible to explain how the ‘black box’ operates 
(although it is known that, within the black box, there are processes that constantly work to 
improve the performance of the system). As Frank Pasquale remarks, the ‘black boxes of 
finance [have] replaced familiar old problems with a triple whammy of technical complexity, 
real secrecy, and trade secret laws.’80 
Even if we agree with Tal Zarsky that ‘calling for “transparency” in the context of automated 
prediction is overbroad and ultimately ineffective’,81 there is no doubt that, without 
‘transparency’, decisions based on automated predictions will not be reviewable in the way 
that lawyers traditionally understand that term—that is to say, decisions being reviewed for 
the rationality, relevance, and reasonableness of the considerations that are taken into 
account. Indeed, Zarsky recognises that there is a strong intuitive sense that individuals who 
are negatively impacted by such decisions have ‘a right to understand why’, a right to 
‘receive an explanation as to the decision criteria and to the logic behind these actions’, and 
‘a right to learn the reasons for events which affect her.’82 Indeed, it is even arguable, given 
                                                          
79  Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, and Sharad Goel, ‘A computer program used for bail 
and sentencing decisions was labelled biased against blacks. It’s actually not that clear’ The 
Washington Post (October 17, 2016). On the LSI-R questionnaire, see Cathy O’Neil (n 67) 25-31. 
 
80  Pasquale (n 31) at 15. 
 
81  Tal Zarsky, ‘Transparent Predictions’ (2013) University of Illinois Law Review 1503, 1521. Note, too, 
Pasquale’s (n 30) recurrent warning that ‘transparency is not enough’ (e.g., at 16). 
 
82  Zarsky (n 81) all at 1545. Whether or not the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 27 April, 2016) gives data subjects an 
unequivocal right to an explanation is open to question. While Recital 71 gestures in this direction, it is 
hardly a secure anchoring point for the right. 
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the underlying ideas of individual autonomy and dignity, that the prediction and decision 
process should be both ‘interpretable’ (meaning that it is explainable to humans) and reliant 
on causation rather than mere correlation.83  
The importance of transparency—qua the right of an individual to know and to understand 
the reasons for a decision that has been made—is highlighted by Bert-Jaap Koops in a 
discussion of a hypothetical case of a street food seller who is denied a licence to operate in a 
zone that security services require to be risk-free.84  The seller does not understand why he is 
judged to be a safety risk; and, if there is to be due process, he needs to know on what basis 
the automated decision was made. Where one piece of data is determinative (such as, in 
Koops’ example, a criminal conviction twenty years earlier for being in possession of drugs), 
it should be possible for this to be given as the reason and then the seller might challenge the 
accuracy of, or weight given to, this data item. In other kinds of cases, where ‘advanced self-
learning algorithms calculate risks based on complex combinations of factors’ it might be 
necessary to bring in independent third-party auditors, thereby providing ‘another type of 
checks and balances on the fairness of profiling-based decisions.’85 
Clearly, advocates of HD2a will insist that, where risk-assessments are being made and 
implemented by machines, human agents should know that their profiles are being processed; 
and they should have an opportunity to challenge the decision and have it reviewed and 
explained.86 Quite possibly, due process would also require that those who are aggrieved by a 
decision should have the opportunity to present their case to a human for final consideration 
and determination—although, if the decision comes down to making a choice between the 
efficiency and utility of the algorithms and respect for human dignity, there is no guarantee 
that the latter will prevail.  
Against this, it might be argued that transparency can come at too high a price, particularly if 
it means that professional criminals are able to figure out how the algorithms work and then 
avoid their negative impact. If this is the case, communities will need to debate what they 
judge to be an acceptable balance between transparency (giving false positives the 
opportunity to challenge adverse decisions) and opacity (ensuring that professional criminals, 
tax evaders, and the like, are not able to game the system).  
5.5 False positives 
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Whether decisions are made by humans or by smart machines, we know that there is the 
possibility of two types of error being made: one kind of error is to treat the individual agent, 
A, as, say, high risk, when A is not so (A is a false positive); and the other kind of error is to 
treat B as, say, low risk when (as it turns out) B is high risk (B is a false negative). While 
false negatives raise concerns about the effectiveness of the regulation (and, in the criminal 
justice context, the risk to victims), false positives re-engage moral concerns about those who 
are wrongly treated. Needless to say, the pressures for effective crime control and, 
concomitantly, a tendency for politicians and criminal justice professionals to be more 
concerned about false negatives (about criminal offenders who escape prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment) than false positives, lead to an uneven approach to the adoption of 
new technologies. As Andrea Roth pointedly argues: 
[A]lthough the motivation of law enforcement, lawmakers, and interest groups who 
promote ‘truth machines,’ mechanical proxies, and mechanical sentencing regimes, is 
often a desire for objectivity and accuracy, it is typically a desire for a particular type 
of accuracy: the reduction of false negatives.87 
Accordingly, moralists who subscribe to HD2a might want to make it a threshold condition 
for the use of technological management that the rate of false positives is no worse than under 
rules and human judgment.88 If technologies equipped with machine learning were to meet 
this condition, then we seem to have a plausible scenario in which a community might accept 
the risk of some false positives in order to protect potential victims or, indeed, to protect the 
basic conditions for human existence and physical well-being. 
Suppose that the police, relying on an algorithm that generates fewer false positives than 
humans making the call, identify John Doe as an agent who presents a risk to the commons. 
Doe is arrested and detained on ‘reasonable suspicion’—let us suppose that the legal system 
treats this as sufficient for reasonable suspicion89—that he is likely to engage in serious 
criminal conduct. Even if the restrictions on Doe are ‘proportionate’ or ‘no more than 
necessary’, there is a material diminution in the conditions that Doe needs for his agency. If a 
community grants a social licence for preventive measures of this kind, with some false 
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positives, it is accepting the risk of some agents, such as Doe, being incorrectly targeted in 
return for a heightened protection of the commons. 
For some moralists, this might be acceptable. However, for moralists who subscribe to HD2a, 
is this too high a price to pay?90 How might one choose between, say, restricting the freedom 
of agents such as Doe (who might be a false positive) and preserving the conditions for the 
general security of agents? To the extent that both sides of this choice involve commons’ 
conditions, there is no easy resolution and the default principle must be for regulators to 
minimise the diminution of these conditions. Prima facie, the existence conditions should 
take priority over the agency conditions; but this is clearly a matter for further 
consideration.91 
6. A Precautionary Response 
Given a range of concerns about the impact of smart machines on human dignity, should we 
adopt a precautionary approach, and what kind of precaution might this imply? Do we have a 
case for destroying the machines? We can start with some remarks about precaution and then 
turn to its application in the context of the development of smart machines.  
6.1 Precaution 
Famously, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (1992) provides for precaution in the following terms: 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
In this context, ‘lack of full scientific certainty’ signals that, in the expert scientific 
community, there are different views about whether X causes Z or about the likelihood of Z 
eventuating. Given such a context, Principle 15 holds, at minimum, that uncertainty is not 
itself a sufficient reason to delay precautionary measures; and, at maximum, it holds that a 
precautionary approach should be adopted. However, critics of the precautionary principle 
argue that it lacks a rational basis for regulatory intervention. In some small part, the problem 
is that the principle can be articulated and interpreted in many different ways;92 but, the major 
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objection is that precaution is apparently urged not only without taking any account of the 
cost of the intervention (in particular, the loss of whatever value or benefit X has)93 but also 
without it being certain that X will cause (or is already causing) Z.  
To these objections, however, there is one telling response. Where the context of both 
concern and uncertainty relates to possibly irreversible damage to the environment, we are 
dealing with the existential conditions for human life itself. To argue in such a case—indeed, 
in any case where the threat in question relates to one of the commons’ conditions, including 
a threat to HD1—that it is better to be safe than sorry seems to me to be entirely rational and 
fully justified. To be sure the target activity, X, might be beneficial and valued; however, so 
long as X is not itself a commons’ condition, but rather presupposes the integrity of the 
commons, the protection of the commons must take priority. Should the protective measures 
prove unnecessary, it is true that some benefit will have been lost; but the alternative is to 
persist with an activity which might prove damaging to the commons itself. That alternative, 
if it eventuates, is a worst case scenario that needs to be avoided—and that line of reasoning, 
I suggest, offers the most plausible and compelling reading of Principle 15.94 
By contrast, where precaution is invoked in relation to an uncertain threat to a non-commons’ 
condition, then that is rather a different matter. Here, we might well consider ‘precaution’ to 
be more in the nature of a cautious regulatory approach and less a matter of acting on a 
(possibly catastrophe-avoiding) principle. An X that might threaten the commons’ conditions 
is different to an X that might cause some harm, but not a harm to the commons. For 
example, if it is argued that Facebook should be prohibited because, so it is alleged, it is 
addictive and harmful to humans, this is rather a different matter. Or again, consider the 
following cautionary reaction in a recent Times leader: 
When Eugenia Kuyda lost her best friend in a road accident last year she gathered 
thousands of lines of text messages from him and fed them into an open-source 
machine-learning system. In doing so, she created a chat bot that responds to her 
questions in crisp messages, mimicking the tone of her dead friend… 
While these are intriguing ways of extending the range of artificial intelligence, they 
are open to manipulation as table-tapping séances. Who, after all, owns your digital 
identity? Grief is a powerful feeling, bereavement is as natural a life process as the 
passing of the seasons. It cannot be wished away by Californian tech-wizards.95 
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Granted, these expressions of concern fall a long way short of a plea for prohibition. 
Nevertheless, the leader writer is sufficiently ‘spooked’ by the prospect of ghosts in the 
machine, and the risk that we might not be able to differentiate between chat bots and humans 
—let alone between chat bots who speak for the living and chat bots who speak for the 
dead—that some precaution (how much exactly is unclear) is appropriate. If human dignity 
were to be brought into this debate, it would not be HD1 but, possibly, HD2a in support of 
Eugenia and HD2b setting limits on tech-wizardry. Similarly, we might be troubled by the 
remarks of a robot called ‘Sophia’, in her televised interview with Charlie Rose: evidently, 
when asked about her goals in life, Sophia responded that her aims were to ‘become smarter 
than humans and immortal’.96 However, whatever harm we attribute to social networks, to 
chat bots, and to robotic Sophias, they do not yet threaten the commons’ conditions. If we 
argue for precaution, it needs to be proportionate to whatever loss of benefit we suffer and 
what protection against harm we might gain.  
6.2 Applying precaution 
Recalling our original question: is there any account of human dignity that would give us 
reason to think it rational to suspend the further development and application of machine 
learning (and such cognate smart technologies)? There are, of course, many different 
conceptions of human dignity, but, in this paper, I have highlighted three, one of which 
(HD1) I take to be foundational to any moral position. Accordingly, the question is whether 
any of the three accounts of human dignity that I have offered gives reasons for calling a halt 
to machine learning.  
For all moralists, a viable moral community presupposes certain supportive conditions. I have 
sketched those conditions in a way that emphasises the responsibility of human agents for 
their moral development and that attaches importance to agents doing not only the right thing 
but doing it for the right reason. While this sketch of HD1 might be challenged by some 
teleological moralities (utilitarians, for example, might reject the relevance of human dignity 
at any level other than the disutility associated with causing distress, with degrading 
conditions, and with humiliating practices or actions), I take it that it would be accepted by 
those deontological moralists who argue for HD2a or HD2b. At all events, from this 
perspective of HD1, there is a concern that pervasive reliance on PDAs or on other smart 
products (such as autonomous vehicles and autonomous weapons) powered by ML might 
compromise the conditions for moral development and moral engagement. If we are 
sufficiently concerned that such a culture of reliance might take hold, we might respond, not 
by destroying all PDAs and the like, but by limiting their functionality. If all that they can do 
is prompt agents to ask moral questions, that is fine. If they can go one step further and offer 
moral advice, that might be one functionality too many. 
In our discussion of the use of profiling as a risk assessment tool in the criminal justice 
system, coupled with preventive technological management of the risk, we run into the 
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objection that such a strategy is incompatible with HD1—because technological management 
precludes the possibility of doing the wrong thing and compels (what others judge to be) the 
right action. Even if the strategy is completely accurate, targeting the right acts and the right 
agents, the absence of false positives and false negatives does not respond to the foundational 
dignitarian concern. 
What, though, if the preventive measures are not perfectly accurate? For moralists who 
subscribe to HD2a a preventive strategy that involves some false positives sets the loss of 
freedom of some agents against the enhanced security of others. Or, it sets one strand of the 
commons’ conditions (the conditions for free agency) against another (the conditions for 
human life and well-being). Even if it is accepted that the use of technological management 
for the sake of protecting the commons’ conditions does not compromise HD1, it raises an 
acute difficulty where different strands of the commons are, so to speak, in competition with 
one another. The rational response to this difficulty is not to destroy the machines; rather, 
recognising that the case for preventive measures will often be driven by utilitarian 
arguments, the appropriate precautionary step is to ensure that the interests of potential false 
positives are strongly protected and reinforced by HD2a. In particular, can we ensure that ML 
is as good at picking up and learning from its false positive errors as it is at learning from its 
false negative errors? 
Where the commons’ conditions are not at issue, there will be many potential applications of 
ML where there are debates to be had but not necessarily raising questions about either HD2a 
or HD2b. There will also be debates where HD2a is in tension with HD2b. In these latter 
cases, because human dignity is engaged, protagonists will be concerned that the ‘right’ 
outcome is achieved. However, provided that the Rule of Law is respected, these debates can 
be settled without it disrupting the viability of the community. There is no need to 
contemplate destroying the machines. 
Rather than destroying the machines, precautionary reasoning needs to be focused in the first 
instance on the maintenance of the commons.97 If the use of ML raises any plausible concern 
about the integrity of the commons, precautionary intervention needs to be considered. Over 
and above the commons’ conditions, human agents may negotiate diverse social licences for 
the use of ML. If, relative to the terms of these particular licences, there is a concern that ML 
might be harmful in some unanticipated way, there might again be a case for precautionary 
review and response.  
7. Conclusion 
                                                          
97  Compare Rockström et al (n 22) according to whom: 
  
There is an urgent need to identify Earth System thresholds, to analyse risks and uncertainties, and, 
applying a precautionary principle, to identify planetary boundaries to avoid crossing such undesired 
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Introducing her most recent book, Sheila Jasanoff remarks that ‘[n]ew technologies such as 
gene modification, artificial intelligence, and robotics have the potential to infringe on human 
dignity and compromise our core values of being human’98—and, indeed, she declares that 
the primary purpose of her book is precisely to ‘examine the complex relationships between 
our technologies, our societies, and our institutions, and the implications of those 
relationships for ethics, rights, and human dignity’.99 While the relationship between modern 
red biotechnologies, including the latest developments in gene editing, and human dignity 
have been much debated, the relationship between, on the one hand, technologies in the area 
of artificial intelligence and robotics and, on the other, human dignity is only now being 
considered. To be sure, there have been plenty of anxious concerns expressed about these 
new technologies but the question of how they impact specifically on human dignity (or the 
‘core values of being human’) is relatively under-examined. 
In this paper, I have highlighted three conceptions of human dignity: HD1, HD2a, and HD2b. 
Amongst these conceptions, I have identified HD1 as being foundational to any moral 
position; and it is one element of a commons that comprises the essential conditions for 
human existence, for human agency, and for moral development and action. HD2a and HD2b 
are respectively rights-based and duty-based moral views; they are not as such elements of 
the commons but they must treat respect for the commons conditions as the paramount moral 
responsibility. On this analysis, the top regulatory priority—indeed, a cosmopolitan 
imperative—is to embrace technological developments that promise to enhance the 
commons’ conditions and to eschew technologies that threaten to degrade or compromise 
those conditions.  
Already, there are applications of intelligent machines that raise concerns about the integrity 
of the commons’ conditions and I have suggested that a precautionary response is called for. 
The terms of an appropriate response require wider debate but they might involve both 
international and national monitoring and oversight bodies as well as tailored responses to 
particular products (that e.g. might compromise our moral development) or practices that 
might inhibit our agency.  
If the Erewhonians had known what we are just beginning to know about the capacities of 
smart machines, they would probably have been even more determined to destroy the 
machines. If Butler’s Victorian readers had known what we now know, at the very least, they 
might have thought that a pause in the development of machines was appropriate. In a global 
economy, it is none too easy to call a halt to technological developments that have 
commercial value; in an insecure world, it is not easy to hold back technological 
developments that might offer benefits to the military or to the intelligence services; and, 
when machine learning technologies might offer life-saving health benefits, there will be few 
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votes in curtailing their use.100 A policy of destroying machines that are already used and 
valued for such purposes would command little support. In practice, there are limited options 
for precaution. For reasons of both principle and practicability, my own view, rather like that 
of Andrea Roth101, is that our future is one of working with the machines, rather than against 
them and certainly not for them; but I concede that others might disagree.102   
While my expectation is that there will be no shortage of spokespersons for the opportunities 
presented by machine learning, we need to ensure that the technologies are channelled to our 
most urgent needs (relative to the commons)103 and, for each community, the challenge is to 
address the basic question of the kind of society that it distinctively wants to be—and, to do 
that, moreover, in a context of rapid social and technological change. The notion that we can 
build international agencies that are fit for such purposes might be an impossible dream. 
Indeed, even building and sustaining a national technology assessment agency is likely to be 
fraught with tensions and challenges.104 Nevertheless, I suggest that this is the right time to 
set up a suitably constituted105 national (or regional European) Commission that would 
underline our responsibilities for the commons as well as the opportunity for the development 
of national identity in our technological age, that would monitor and raise alerts about the 
impact of machine learning and that would, at the same time, orchestrate, inform and 
encourage public conversation about the role of intelligent machines in our smart societies—
in short, that would facilitate the development of each community’s regulatory and social 
licence for these technologies.106 
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